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THE FUTURE OF ENTERPRISE 
ORGANIZATION 
Eric W. Orts* 
THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE. By Henry Hansmann. Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1996 . Pp. xi, 363. $39. 95. 
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. 
By G.P. Stapledon. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1996 . Pp. vi, 376 . 
$98. 
Both the law and business schools at the University of Michigan 
offer a basic course in Enterprise Organization. This tradition owes 
to the influence of Professor Alfred Conard, one of the leading 
scholars of his generation, who taught during most of his career at 
the University of Michigan Law School.1 The tradition persists in 
part because Enterprise Organization suggests an appropriately 
broad view of its topic, unlike more common course titles such as 
Corporations or Business Ass9ciations. We live in a world popu­
lated not only by people but also the organized legal entities we 
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, University of Penn­
sylvania; VISiting Professor of Law, University of Leuven (1998) and University of Michigan 
(1997). B.A. 1982, Oberlin; M.A. 1985, New School for Social Research; J.D. 1988, Michigan; 
J.S.D. 1991, Columbia. - Ed. I thank Al Conard and Henry Hansmann for co=ents but 
emphasize that any errors are mine. 
1. See ALFRED F. CoNARD ET AL., ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION: CASES, STATUTES, AND 
ANALYSIS ON EMPLOYMENT, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AssocIATIONS, AND CORPORATIONS 
(4th ed. 1987). 
As Professor Conard tells the story, the development of Enterprise Organization had 
several influences. Letter from Alfred Conard, Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, emeritus, 
University of Michigan, to Eric Orts, Apr. 6, 1998 (on file with author). First, as a law stu­
dent, he took separate courses in Agency, Partnership, and Corporations, each organized in 
schematic rather than economic terms. He was introduced to a more integrated treatment 
during a year of graduate study for a J.S.D. at Columbia University when he came across a 
casebook by Magill and Hamilton. See RoswsLL FoSTER MAGILL & ROBERT P. HAMILTON, 
Bus1NESs AssocIATIONS (1933-35). When teaching at the University of Illinois, Conard pub­
lished a casebook combining agency and partnership. See Al.FRED F. CONARD ET AL., 
AGENCY, AssOCIATIONS, EMPLOYMENT LICENSING & PARTNERSHIPS (1972). When he 
moved to Michigan, he taught a course in Business Associations through a casebook by 
Laylin James. See LAYLIN JAMES, BuslNESs AssocIATIONS (2d ed. 1947). Conard believes 
James's text was the first to interweave agency, partnership, and corporate law in an inte­
grated course; at least it influenced him to adopt this framework for his own casebook. 
Meanwhile, back at Columbia, Berle and Warren changed the name of their course to Busi­
ness Organizations. See A.A. BERLE & WILLIAM C. WARREN, BuslNESs ORGANIZATIONS 
(1948). Conard's contributions were to put these influences together and to adopt the word 
"enterprise" - partly to comprehend nonprofit organizations, partly to capture the eco­
nomic idea of an "undertaking," and partly to include problems in securities regulation. See 
Letter, supra. 
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create. Business firms and nonprofit organizations have legal 
frameworks, and economic forces affect them in various ways. An 
important topic for social research - including not only law and 
economics, but also other disciplines - is to uncover the springs of 
motivation, power, and belief that underlie the organizations that 
figure so largely in our everyday·existence. 
The Ownership of Enterprise and Institutional Shareholders and 
Corporate Governance confirm Professor Conard's broad view of 
the subject of Enterprise Organization, though they travel in two 
different directions. One direction focuses on what may be called 
the "microanalysis of institutions, "  which breaks down complex 
forms of organization in· terms of their elements - namely, individ­
uals and their motivations. 2 The other direction focuses on the big 
picture, a "macroanalysis of society" and its major developmental 
changes. These two directions correspond roughly with the func­
tional differentiation between micro- and macroeconomics. In my 
estimation, the same division of labor makes sense in studying the 
law of enterprise organization and characterizes its likely future. 
I. THE MI CROANALYSIS OF ENTERPRI SE 
In The Ownership of Enterprise, Professor Henry Hansmann 3 
collects the themes of a number of major contributions in his ex­
traordinarily productive career. He combines law and economics in 
a refreshing and undogmatic fashion to explore the elemental 
forces that drive enterprise to be structured in various ways. 
Hansmann's choice of topics is eclectic, but this range derives from 
the impressive scope of his research. He is perhaps best known for 
his scholarship on employee ownership,4 a fact that explains his 
continuing interest in the worker-owned manufacturing enterprises 
of the Mondragon system in Spain (pp. 98- 103), as well as experi­
ments in worker ownership at United Airlines and Weirton Steel in 
the United States (pp. 107, 1 17- 18). His discussion of the ownership 
of golf courses (pp. 184-85) gives a case study in the analysis of 
"status organizations," which includes his own Yale Law School.5 
In short, The Ownership of Enterprise is worth reading if only for 
2. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HAR.v. L. REv. 1393, 1425-29 (1996). 
3. Sam Harris Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
4. See Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, 
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990); Henry Hansmann, 
Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 589 (1993). 
5. See Henry Hansmann, A Theory of Status Organizations, 2 J.L. EcoN. & 0Ro. 119 
(1986). Hansmann offers a humbling account for professors of the reasons students choose to 
attend elite universities - namely, "with an eye to the intelligence, previous education, social 
attractiveness, athletic ability, and future promise of its other students" and "for the sake of 
developing contacts that are later useful in life," rather than "the quality of the instructional 
program." Pp. 185-86. Faculty similarly are motivated to join schools "not only, or even 
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the purpose of appreciating the depth and breadth of Hansmann's 
scholarship to date.6 
But the book also offers much more. It brings together a ca­
reer's worth of thinking into a general thesis about how the world 
of enterprise organization works. Hansmann's main argument is 
that broad generalizations cannot be made about the most efficient 
or desirable structure of ownership in free enterprise societies. The 
"investor ownership" model of capitalism that puts shareholders 
and creditors at the center is "contingent" on the economics of en­
terprise, legal and political structures, changing technologies, and 
cultural differences (pp. 1-4, 287-88, 294-97). 
Hansmann develops this thesis through an empirical analysis of 
various kinds of enterprise that do not fit the model of investor­
owned firms. He then provides an economic explanation for the 
ownership structure of enterprise in terms of two criteria: the costs 
of contracting and the costs of ownership.7 Unlike other economic 
theorists who assume that a capitalist model of investor ownership 
always makes better sense than other modes of organization, 
Hansmann recognizes a plurality of forms of enterprise. At the 
same time, he offers a "comparative study of organizational types" 
that explains why investor ownership is common in most, if not all, 
forms of business enterprise (p. 3). 
A. The Costs of Contracting 
Hansmann is a contractarian economist to the extent that he 
adopts a view of the firm as "a nexus of contracts" or, more pre­
cisely, as "the common signatory of a grpup of contracts" (p. 18). 
The costs of contracting therefore figure largely in his explanation 
for the structure of enterprise. There are at least six sources of 
these costs. 
, 
1. Simple market power includes both monopoly power of a 
firm with respect to its customers and monopsony power with re­
spect to a firm's suppliers (pp. 24-25). The costs of market power 
provide a strong incentive for a potentially exploited group to exert 
influence to reduce the costs of dealing with a monopoly or monop­
sony through direct ownership or public regulation. For example, 
customers of electricity or telephone services who find themselves 
threatened with monopoly pricing may seek cooperative or public 
primarily, on the basis of work conditions such as salary and teaching load, but also on the 
basis of the professional accomplishments of the other members of the faculty." P. 192. 
6. The primary articles from which the book draws are listed, p. 363, and other articles 
are dispersed in various footnotes. 
7. Pp. 20-22, 287. See also Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. EcoN. & 
0RG. 267 (1988) (introducing the basic concepts on which The Ownership of Enterprise 
elaborates). 
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ownership of the utility or lobby for regulation of prices (pp. 168-
70, 176-80). Farmers who face monopsony pricing by cartels of 
grain purchasers may bypass them through cooperative ownership 
of grain elevators or cooperative marketing firms (pp. 122-25). 
2. Lock-in refers to dependent relationships that may arise be­
tween various groups that contract with a firm over a long period of 
time (p. 25). For example, an individual who works for one firm 
may develop firm-specific human capital that cannot be transferred 
to another. Lock-in may provide an explanation for why some 
firms become employee-owned (p. 26), though Hansmann does not 
find empirical evidence to corroborate this view and concludes that 
other factors must play a greater role (pp. 71-72). Lock-in also ex­
plains, at least partially, the vertical integration of firms with their 
suppliers and distributors. 8 
3. Long-term contracting risks refer to the well-known problem 
that uncertainty increases as the duration of a contract lengthens. 
An example is life insurance (p. 27). Before advances in actuarial 
science and regulatory changes made investor-owned life insurance 
viable, mutual ownership of life insurance companies by the policy­
holders made sense because the contractual terms could be changed 
and the proceeds distributed as the future - and life expectancy -
grew ever more certain with time (pp. 266-74). 
4. Asymmetric information and strategic bargaining refer to a 
general problem involved in any complex economic enterprise: 
some groups have more accurate and complete information than 
others (pp. 27-29). Groups with better information enjoy a better 
bargaining position. A firm's managers, for example, often have 
better information than customers about the firm's products. If no 
other solution is found - such as consumer protection legislation 
or product liability rules - the costs of asymmetric information 
may lead customers to acquire ownership in the firm. For example, 
farmers band together in supply cooperatives to solve the problem 
of asymmetric information about the quality of feed and fertilizer.9 
8. Pp. 26-27. For economic treatments of vertical integration, see Sanford J. Grossman & 
Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration, 94 J. PoL. EcoN. 691 (1986); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 297 (1978). 
9. Pp. 28, 149-51. A similar analysis explains the economic motivation for some worker 
ownership structures. If a firm's managers see employees as merely "tools" or "factors of 
production," the managers have an incentive to withhold essential information from their 
employees, including any labor unions, in order to improve their bargaining position and 
enhance returns for investors. From the workers' point of view, a seat on the board for a 
labor representative or an employee buyout may reduce the costs of this informational asym­
metcy. Pp. 29, 70-73. From the perspective of outside investors, the converse is true: reduc­
ing the asy=etcy of information vis-a-vis workers may increase the costs of supplying 
capital to these firms. 
Hansmann argues persuasively, however, that the "conventional wisdom that employee 
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5. Conflicts of interest describe the inevitable costs of meeting 
the demands of the diverse groups of people involved in most en­
terprises. These costs grow larger as an enterprise increases in size 
and complexity. Hansmann emphasizes the importance of resolv­
ing conflicts among whom he calls the "patrons" of the firm. Pa­
trons "comprise all persons who transact with a firm either as 
purchasers of the firm's products or as sellers �o the firm of sup­
plies, labor, or other factors of production."10 Even within one 
group of patrons, interests can diverge. Among employees, for ex­
ample, older workers may prefer lower-risk policies than younger 
workers who may accept greater risk in return for higher wages (p. 
3 1). Or older workers with retirement savings invested in pensions 
or employee stock ownership plans may ally themselves more 
closely with investors than with younger workers (p. 90). Balancing 
the interests of patrons is central to structuring the ownership of 
enterprise. Hansmann concludes that the proper structure depends 
on the particular circumstances of an enterprise and the relative 
costs for patrons who have an interest in it. 
6. Alienation, a concept from social psychology, refers to the 
tendency of workers in modem industrial societies to feel detached 
from the purpose of their work and therefore unmotivated.11 
Hansmann recognizes market contracting to be "adversarial" and 
sometimes "unpleasant." Many people prefer "relationships that 
are more cooperative, trusting, or altruistic" (p. 32). The motiva-
ownership is poorly suited to capital-intensive industries" is overstated. P. 75. Employees 
may often agree to supply capital even in the face of increased and nondiversified risk, and a 
great deal of financing may be obtained through debt rather than outside e quity. Pp. 75-76. 
10. P. 12. Other commentators refer to the various interests in firms as stakeholders, but 
Hansmann wants to avoid the ideological baggage that this term sometimes carries. He says 
that those who use the term "stakeholders" to include "workers, customers, suppliers, mem­
bers of the local community, and environmental groups" believe these groups "should have 
representation on the firm's board of directors." P. 44. In fact, the literature on stakeholder 
management theory is more diverse, and much of it at least purports to be more descriptive 
than normative. See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of 
the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 65 {1995); 
Eric W. Orts, A North American Legal Perspective on Stakeholder Management Theory, in 
PERSPECilVES ON COMPANY LAW: 2 165 {Fiona Macmillan Patfield ed., 1997). The under­
standing of "stakeholder" as one who bears a risk in an enterprise seems roughly synony­
mous with Hansmann's "patron." To my knowledge, Hansmann's reference to "patrons" is 
unique, but it is no worse than "stakeholder." One might also refer simply to various "inter­
ests" in an enterprise. For convenience and to avoid confusion, however, I adopt 
Hansmann's use of "patrons" in this review. 
11. This definition offers only one possible meaning of the complex idea of alienation, 
which has roots in religious thought as well as in the social theories of Rousseau, Hegel, and 
Marx. See ADAM ScHAFF, ALIENATION AS A SocIAL PHENOMENON 24-55 {1980). Another 
commentator observes that alienation is "used to denote a great variety of often quite dissim­
ilar phenomena . ... within separate disciplines," including anthropology, economics, educa­
tional theory, literature, philosophy, political science, and sociology. Frank Johnson, 
Alienation: Overview and Introduction, in ALIENATION: CONCEPT, TEru.r, AND MEANINGS 3, 
6-25 {Frank Johnson ed., 1973). Hansmann does not specify exactly what he means by aliena­
tion, but the general sense suggested in the text serves as an approximation. 
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tions of some people to be sheltered from the storms of constant 
market contracting and to avoid feeling alienated therefore explain 
some forms of enterprise organization. Although Hansmann avoids 
deeper ideological controversy about the concept of alienation, it is 
to his credit that he sees the phenomenon as important. Psycholog­
ical preferences and social conditions, as well as calculations about 
economic efficiency, .affect the structure of enterprise. 
B. The Costs of Ownership 
Although Hansmann emphasizes the costs of contracting, he 
recognizes that ownership also has costs. The costs of ownership 
combine with the costs of contracting to determine the structure of 
enterprise. These costs of ownership fall into four general types: 
controlling managers, collective decisionmaking, risk bearing, and 
organizational transition. 
1. The costs of controlling managers. Because Hansmann ar­
gues that any group of patrons can own a firm in terms of rights to 
residual profits - whether the owners are shareholders, creditors, 
employees, or some combination - he portrays managers as a 
nearly universal cost of ownership.12 This account is a refreshing 
reversal of the usual economic focus on the agency costs of employ­
ees and other lower-level functionaries.13 
The costs of controlling managers divide into monitoring and 
managerial opportunism. Monitoring includes costs of information 
(finding out what managers are doing), communication (finding out 
what an often dispersed group of patron-owners want), and en­
forcement (getting managers to follow the patron-owners' prefer­
ences) (p. 36). Managerial opportunism refers to the possibility 
that managers will "malinger or engage in self-dealing transactions" 
(p. 37). A management leveraged buyout, for example, presents 
this kind of risk.14 
12. Some enterprises may dispense with managers if they are sufficiently small. 
13. Alternatively, managers might also be described as patrons of the firm, a subclass of 
employees, and they may even purchase ownership of the firm, such as in a management 
leveraged buyout (MBO). In a MB O, the managers of a corporation buy a controlling equity 
interest from the shareholders, which is usually financed through increased debt. MB Os thus 
leverage the remaining equity (now owned by managers) with a higher debt-to-equity ratio. 
See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged 
Recapitalizations, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 517, 519-24 (1988). Hansmann does not discuss MBOs, 
but presumably he could account for this kind of transaction in terms of managers-as-em­
ployees becoming managers-as-owners. The costs of controlling managers would be repli­
cated for the new managers-as-owners, though an economic benefit of MBOs is arguably to 
reduce these costs. 
14. See Victor Bradney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of 
Contract, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1425-26 (1985); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: 
How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 U CLA L. REv. 1009, 1017-18 (1997). 
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2. Collective decisionmaking among patrons who participate in 
the governance of a firm imposes costs relating to "differences of 
opinion concerning the firm's policies and programs" (p. 39). These 
costs "result from heterogeneity of interests among the owners" (p. 
40). They are "logically distinct" from the agency costs of managers 
because managers impose agency costs regardless of ownership 
structure (p. 39). According to Hansmann, the costs of collective 
decisionmaking often determine which group of patrons - inves­
tors, employees, suppliers, or customers - will assume ownership 
(p. 288). 
The general rule of collective decisionmaking, subject to other 
costs of contracting and ownership, is that the most homogenous 
and unconflicted group in an enterprise will become its owners. 
One important implication is that collective decisionmaking costs 
will impede employee ownership in most situations of any complex­
ity (pp. 91, 119). A corollary is that the relative uniformity of the 
interests of investors - "to maximize the net present value of the 
firm's earnings" - often provides an advantage for investor-owned 
enterprise (p. 62). At the same time, the interests of investors may 
conflict. For example, shareholders often have a greater tolerance 
for risk than creditors. Preferences may also vary within patron 
groups, such as among shareholders or different creditors.15 
3. Risk bearing refers to the ability to bear the financial risk of 
loss. Ownership of an enterprise will tend to fall to the patrons who 
are best able "to bear those risks - for example, through diversifi­
cation" (pp. 44-45). The ability to bear and diversify risks leads in 
most circumstances to investor ownership (p. 57). Although some 
commentators argue that this factor explains the relative scarcity of 
employee ownership, Hansmann argues that the empirical evidence 
does not support the claim.16 One reason is that at least for non­
unionized "at will" employees, the financial risks of layoffs often 
equal or exceed the risks of ownership (pp. 78-79). 
4. Entrepreneurship and the costs of transition. Although 
Hansmann argues that the most efficient structures of enterprise 
15. For two competing views of preferences among shareholders, compare Henry T.C. 
Hu, Risk, Tzme, and Fiduciary Principles in'Corporate Investment, 38 U C L A  L. REv. 277, 
287, 389 (1990) (recognizing shareholders may have different preferences toward risk, but 
recommending "blissful shareholder wealth maximization" as a standard for enforcement of 
fiduciary duties) with Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Cor­
porate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CALL. REv. 1021, 1025-29 (criticizing the abstract 
conception of "fictional shareholders" with only wealth-maximizing preferences as dehuman­
izing). Shareholders' preferences will also diverge to the extent that some shareholders may 
also be managers, rank-and-file employees, or creditors. With respect to creditors, prefer­
ences will vary in accordance with risk, including such factors as interest rates and whether 
the debt obligations involved are secured, subordinated, or convertible into equity. 
16. P. 45. Counterexamples include worker ownership in relatively risky enterprises such 
as farming, investment banking, and the plywood industry. P. 78. 
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will win out in the long run (pp. 287, 295-96), he recognizes that the 
start-up costs of organizing a firm and the costs of transferring own­
ership from one group of patrons to another can raise barriers to 
otherwise desirable ownership structures.17 Such transitional trans­
actions entail costs that may outweigh the gains to be achieved by 
the change.18 The costs of transition, in other words, result in some 
degree of path dependence.19 
Hansmann notes two sources of organizational inertia. First, 
"the presence of established brokers who specialize in ownership 
transactions" and "standardized procedures for handling those 
transactions" are needed to reduce the costs of transition (p. 46). 
Corporate lawyers and investment bankers, for example, are often 
needed to serve as transactional engineers to change ownership 
structure.20 Second, those who benefit from current ownership 
structures often entrench themselves, even when change would be 
in the best interests of other patrons of the firm (p. 46). To para­
phrase the Delaware Supreme Court, there is an omnipresent risk 
that a controlling group may act primarily in its own interest rather 
than the interests of the enterprise as a whole.21 
17. A co=on route for the growth of an enterprise in the United States is to fund a 
closely held corporation initially through venture capital and then, when the firm has become 
established, "going public" through an initial public offering to shareholders. P. 45. See also 
Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of the Capital Mar­
kets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. Fm. Econ. 243 (1998) (exploring the functional link 
between venture capital and stock markets, especially the role of the initial public offering); 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital 
and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 865 (1997) (compar­
ing the entrepreneurial approach of the United States with Japan's system). Other kinds of 
transitions include the purchase of a firm by its employees, suppliers, or customers through 
leveraged transactions or otherwise. The employee buyout of United Airlines, for example, 
was a leveraged transaction. See Ezra R. Field, Note, Money for Nothing and Leverage for 
Free: The Politics and History of the Leveraged ESOP Subsidy, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 740, 749-
51 & n.77 (1997). 
18. For example, a leveraged transaction may provide efficiency gains through the struc­
tural power of increased debt to discipline managers. For an overview of this functional use 
of debt, see George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corpo­
rate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1073 (1995). However, if the transaction costs of changing 
the capital structure exceed the economic gains anticipated through increased leverage, then 
the transitional transaction needed to improve the organizational structure will not take 
place. 
19. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REv. 
641, 643-62 (1996) (discussing concept of path dependence). 
20. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243, 253-55 (1984) (describing lawyers as "transaction cost 
engineers"). 
21. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
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C. Explaining the Structure of Ownership in the Real World 
Hansmann offers a rich and knowledgeable empirical account of 
the current structure of enterprise organization in addition to his 
theoretical analysis of the costs of contracting and ownership. He 
explodes the myth that capitalism inevitably follows a paradigm of 
investor ownership by showing how the world is populated by a va­
riety of ownership structures. Rather than a monotonous world of 
enterprises owned always by a class of capitalist investors, there are 
a number of competing organizational forms. 
For example, firms that offer professional services are often 
owned by the same people who do the professional work, including 
doctors, lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers, management 
consultants, and investment bankers (p. 67). Hansmann overstates 
the point when he says that these firms are "among the world's 
purest examples of employee ownership," given their usual hierar­
chical structure.22 But his general point is well taken. Partners in 
professional firms are not. equivalent t9 outside capital investors. 
Other examples of employee ownership dot the contemporary 
landscape. Taxi cab companies are often employee-owned, as are 
some garbage removal companies (p. 67). Experiments in em­
ployee ownership of large enterprises are underway in the United 
States and Europe.23 The expansion of employee stock ownership 
plans, the popularity of profit-sharing plans, and European 
codetermination show at least the potential for substantial em­
ployee participation in ownership and governance of business en­
terprise in the future.24 
22. P. 67. Most professional firms of doctors, lawyers, and others are very hierarchical in 
depending on a number of lower-level employees, including nurses, paralegals, and clerical 
staff. They also often conduct a "tournament" or "winner-take-all" competition among en­
try-level professionals for advancement to status as equity owners - for example, associates 
in law firms competing to "make partner." See MARc GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, 
TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF TIIE BIG LAW FIRM 100-02, 137 
(1991); ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. CooK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 7-8 (1995). 
23. See supra text accompanying note 4. Hansmann points out, however, that some cases 
often cited as involving employee ownership, including the Avis rental car company, Norton 
publishers, and the failed PeopleExpress airline, are not in fact employee-controlled. In­
stead, a small group of top-level managers control these firms, and rank-and-file employees 
participate only as equity investors without effective voting power. P. 108. 
24. Pp. 105-12. For an optimistic view of the economic prospects for employee owner­
ship, see Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 159, 162-63 
(1991). On the expanding use of ESOPs, see JosEPH RAPHAEL BLASI & DOUGLAS LYNN 
KRusE, THE NEW OWNERS: THE MAss EMERGENCE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN PUBLIC 
CoMPANIES AND WHAT IT MEANS TO AMERICAN BusINESs (1991). On the increasing use of 
profit-sharing plans, see Martin L. Weitzman & Douglas L. Kruse, Profit Sharing and 
Productivity, in PA YING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LooK AT TIIE EVIDENCE 95 (Alan S. Blinder 
ed., 1990). For an introduction to the codetermination debate that remains salient in Europe, 
see Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for 
Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 203 
(1994); Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with 
Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1338 (1984). 
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Less familiar examples - at least to urban dwellers - expand 
one's perspective of enterprise ownership in other directions. Mar­
keting cooperatives are the rule in agriculture. Ocean Spray cran­
berries, Sunkist oranges, Sun Maid raisins, Land O'Lakes butter, 
and Welch's grape juice are all marketing and processing coopera­
tives rather than integrated firms owned by investors (p. 12 1). Con­
sumer cooperatives for the supply of livestock feed, seed, fertilizer, 
and pesticides are also common in farming (p. 149). 
Even in urban environments, non-investor-owned enterprises 
are plentiful. True-Value, Ace, and Servistar are retailer-owned 
hardware wholesale cooperatives (pp. 157-58, 336 n.23). Associated 
Press is a cooperative owned by thousands of participating newspa­
pers and broadcasting networks (p. 158). MasterCard and Visa are 
also cooperatives owned by hundreds of participating banks.25 
What explains these departures from the norm of investor­
owned firms in capitalist societies? For example, why are some util­
ities provided by public or consumer cooperatives rather than in­
vestor-owned firms? Why are some banks and hospitals organized 
as nonprofits and others investor-owned? Why is selling cranber­
ries, oranges, raisins, butter, and grape juice like selling news stories 
and credit cards? 
Like the reviewer of a good mystery, I will leave these questions 
unanswered. Suffice it to say here that Hansmann suggests answers 
along the lines of comparative costs of contracting and ownership. 
Those who examine these specific areas of enterprise organization 
as well as those who wish to argue for alternatives, such as worker 
ownership or consumer cooperatives, should consult his arguments. 
In each case, Hansmann gives economic arguments that favor inves­
tor ownership, but he also addresses the most obvious objections 
In Hansmann's analysis, employee ownership proves superior to traditional investor­
owned enterprises in some circumstances. Employee ownership tends to reduce costs of 
lock-in, asymmetric information, alienation, and controlling managers. The benefits of em­
ployee ownership are often offset, however, by other costs - especially when firms grow 
large. Diverse groups of employee-owners tend to increase the costs of collective decision­
making and risk bearing. See supra sections I.A, I.B. Strong empirical evidence of employee 
ownership in some businesses suggests that competition between employee-owned and inves­
tor-owned enterprises will continue in the future, and the mix will fluctuate according to 
changing economic, legal, technological, and cultural conditions. For a recent economic anal­
ysis of employee ownership emphasizing its role in corporations, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Em­
ployee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The Case of United Airlines, in 
CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY 437 (Sloan Project on Corporate Governance, Columbia 
Law School, May 1998). 
25. Pp. 158-59. Note, however, that the cooperatives in hardware, news, and credit cards 
are almost always controlled by members who are investor-owned enterprises. Hansmann 
does not always distinguish between integrated firms and groups of firms. For example, the 
banks issuing Visa cards and newspapers using Associated Press reports are mostly investor­
owned. This observation undercuts the implication that might otherwise follow from 
Hansmann's analysis that investor-owned enterprises do not constitute the vast majority of 
business firms. 
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that pure free-enterprise spirits may raise to his claim that investor 
ownership is not always the most efficient form of enterprise. He 
considers the possibilities that regulatory bias in the form of tax 
breaks, antitrust rules, or special subsidies may skew the structure 
of enterprise away from an ideal of investor ownership. In the end, 
Hansmann argues persuasively that a mix of economic factors com­
bine to produce the diversity of ownership forms that we observe in 
the real world. 
II. SOME CRITICISMS OF lIANsMANN'S ACCOUNT OF 
ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 
I tum now to offer several constructive criticisms of Hansmann's 
microanalysis of enterprise. The first two are broadly theoretical. 
A third focuses on the concept of ownership in nonprofit organiza­
tions. The last reconsiders the role of the business corporation. 
A. The Benefits of Organization 
Although Hansmann provides a detailed account of the costs of 
enterprise organization, he omits a description of the benefits. He is 
correct that the forms of enterprise that we observe in free market 
societies are determined in part by the relative costs of contracting 
and ownership. The benefits of organization, however, are also 
considerable. They include not only the psychological fact that peo­
ple often like to work together,26 but also the increased productivity 
achieved through specialization and the division of labor within au­
thoritative structures.27 Organized enterprise often represents "a 
social community specializing in the speed and efficiency in the cre­
ation and transfer of knowledge."28 Economies of scale and scope 
are also important.29 Considering the benefits as well as the costs 
26. In this respect, Hansmann's treatment of the cost of alienation might be restated as a 
benefit. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
27. For classic economic theories that emphasize the benefits of specialization, see FRANK 
KNIGHT, RrsK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 271 (1964) (1st ed. 1921) (describing the "mani­
fold specialization of function" in business enterprise); 1 KARL MARx, CAPITAL: A CRI· 
TIQUE OF PoLmCAL EcoNOMY 368-94 (Samuel Moore &·Edward Aveling trans., Random 
House 1906) (1st ed. 1859) (describing the economic benefits of specialization in capitalist 
manufacturing); 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 7-16 (University of Chicago Press 1976) (1st ed. 1776) (including the 
famous example of specialization of labor in pin-making). In fairness, Hansmann alludes to 
one benefit of specialization, though again negatively as a cost: the ability to bear risk. See 
supra text accompanying note 16. 
28. Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and Leaming, 
7 0Ro. Ser. 502, 503 (1996). 
29. "[E]conomies of scale" are "those that result when the increased size of a single oper­
ating unit producing or distributing a single product [or service] reduces the unit cost of 
production or distribution," and "economies of scope" are "[e]conomies of joint production 
or distribution" that result "from the use of processes within a single operating unit to pro-
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of organization would provide a more comprehensive explanation 
for the ownership of enterprise than Hansmann provides. 
B. The Concept of Ownership 
Hansmann's treatment of the concept of ownership in enterprise 
organization is somewhat flawed - or at least unclear. He argues 
that ownership "has two essential attributes: exercise of control 
and receipt of residual earnings" (p. 35). He further maintains that 
"outright ownership of assets is not an essential aspect of what we 
call a firm" (p. 19), though he sees the various costs of ownership to 
be important. Unlike Hansmann, I believe that the concept of own­
ership of assets and property in organizations deserves a higher 
profile.30 
Consider a hypothetical with which Hansmann supports his ar­
gument that some forms of enterprise have no ownership. He 
imagines a sports team in which the "only assets are contracts, " in­
cluding "(a) an exclusive claim on the services . . .  of a group of 
football players and a coach, (b) access to a stadium ... ( c) and the 
right to play, and divide receipts from, a series of games against 
other teams . . .  " (p. 301 n.16). Notwithstanding the doubtful as­
sumption that such a team would not own any equipment - for 
example, uniforms, pads, helmets, and even footballs - the hypo­
thetical includes a property right: the rental of the stadium, not to 
mention television rights. Hansmann implies that a lease does not 
amount to a property interest as well as a contract.31 This view 
would represent a constricted concept of ownership.32 
Despite Hansmann's claim that "ownership of a firm need have 
nothing to do with title to assets or with investment or ownership of 
duce or distribute more than one product [or service]." .Al.FRED D. CHANDLER, ScALE AND 
SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 17 (1990). 
30. For economic accounts of enterprise that emphasize property rights of ownership, see 
OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CoNTRAcrs, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 29-72 (1995); Grossman & 
Hart, supra note 8; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 
J. PoL. EcoN. 1119 (1990). See also STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 317-79 
(1990) (advancing a theory of corporations involving property rights); Tamar Frankel, The 
Legal Infrastmcture of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REv. 389 
(1993) (emphasizing property as well as contracts); Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A 
Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & PoLY. REv. 264 (1998) (combining legal concepts of 
agency, contracts, and property in a theory of enterprise organization). 
31. That a leasehold does not represent ownership of a "real" property interest is a feudal 
notion. Nemo potest esse dominllS et tenens ("No man can be both tenant and lord."). For a 
summary of the broader modem view of property as a complex "bundle of rights, " see 
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx 
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621, 660-67 (1998). 
32. For a broader view of ownership than Hansmann offers, see A.M. Honor6, Owner­
ship, in OXFORD EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-28 (A.G. Guest ed. , 1961) (describing 
various "incidents" of ownership). See also Jolin Kay & Aubrey Silberston, Corporate Gov­
ernance, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW: 2, supra note 10, at 49, 52-56 (applying Ho­
nore's view of ownership to companies). 
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capital" (p. 301), he does not adhere strictly to this contention in 
most of the book. He agrees that "for the purposes at hand there 
seems little point in trying to draw a strong distinction between con­
tractual rights and property rights" (p. 301). Therefore, even if one 
disagrees with some aspects of Hansmann's contractarian theory of 
ownership, this disagreement does not detract from the contribu­
tion he makes to understanding the dynamics of the ownership of 
enterprise. On the contrary, Hansmann's account of ownership is 
broadly consistent with a view that enterprise consists of property 
as well as contracts. 
C. The Ownership of Nonprofit Enterprise 
Hansmann's limited conception of ownership weakens his anal­
ysis of nonprofit organizations, though he nevertheless provides an 
important contribution to understanding them (pp. 227-45). 
Hansmann maintains there are "no owners" of nonprofit enter­
prises (p. 228), though he then explains such enterprises through an 
analysis based partly on the costs of ownership (pp. 238-42). He 
admits that nonprofits have no owners only "by definition," and he 
again defines owners as "persons who have a share in both control 
and residual earnings" (p. 228). As discussed above, this definition 
of ownership is too narrow.33 Nonprofit organizations indeed own 
property, even though they cannot distribute proceeds as "profits" 
to patrons.34 Those who control a nonprofit organization have au­
thority over its property. Nonprofits also have patrons, just as 
other firms do, and these patrons make conflicting demands on the 
nonprofit firm's resources. This is not to say the concept of owner­
ship in nonprofit organization is unproblematic.35 Defining the 
problem away, however, is not helpful.36 
33. See supra section I I.B. 
34. See, e.g., 1 JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CoRPORATIONs § 1.18, at 1.48-49 {1995). 
35. Consider, for example, the question of who owns the property of a religious institu­
tion. The answer can quickly become metaphysical. 
36. One promising approach to the conceptual problem of ownership of nonprofit organi­
zations emphasizes the "entity" theory of organizational personality as opposed to theories 
that insist on breaking down organizations into "aggregates of individuals" that compose 
them. See Orts, supra note 30, at 283 n.92 (collecting sources). Unlike investor-owned firms, 
nonprofit organizations have no residual owners who have a legal claim to profits. Because 
distribution of earnings as profits is legally prohibited, nonprofit managers and trustees make 
decisions about the use of surplus earnings for the benefit of the patrons whom the nonprofit 
organization is meant to serve. The metaphysical problem of the purpose of religious institu­
tions may remain. See supra, note 35. At least on the secular level, however, Hansmann is 
correct to point out that nonprofit enterprises are similar to their more businesslike counter­
parts in responding to conflicting claims of their patrons. In this sense, the ownership of 
enterprise is a flexible concept - as Hansmann emphasizes - and its structure varies ac­
cording to economic circumstances and the demands of patrons. At least in philanthropic 
nonprofit organizations, such as educational or religious institutions, the influence of inter­
pretations of the purpose and objective of an enterprise by decisionmakers is also important. 
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Nevertheless, Hansmann's contribution, drawing on previous 
work that he has done in this area, is important.37 Too often, schol­
ars ignore the organizational principles and practices of nonprofit 
enterprise.38 Nonprofits play a significant role not only in organiza­
tions devoted to charity, religion, and politics, but also in business. 
By one estimate, nonprofits account for approximately fifteen per­
cent of total GNP.39 They supply two-thirds of all hospital care, 
half of children's day care, a quarter of nursing care, a fifth of col­
lege education, and a tenth of primary and secondary education (p. 
227). Hansmann applies his calculus of the costs of contracting and 
ownership to account for this significant presence of nonprofit orga­
nizations in the economy (pp. 228-44). His interesting conclusion is 
that nonprofit organizations do not exist simply because of tax ex­
emptions and other government benefits (p. 244). Other economic 
advantages, including solutions to collective action and public 
goods problems, help to explain the persistence of the nonprofit 
form.4o 
D. The Missing Business Corporation 
A virtue of Hansmann's microanalytic approach in The Owner­
ship of Enterprise is that it canvasses the many forms of organiza­
tion that present alternatives to the business corporation. 
Nonprofit corporations, cooperatives of various sorts, and other in­
teresting coalitions fill the pages of the book. Almost as a by­
product of his analysis, Hansmann describes the business 
corporation as "a capital cooperative."41 It is puzzling that 
Perhaps for business enterprises as well, a view of purpose and objective broader than eco­
nomic gain should play a role. See infra section III.D, Part V. 
37. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 
497 {1981); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980). 
38. See Developments in the Law - Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1578, 
1583 {1992) ("For many years, only tax specialists and a few cognoscenti appreciated the 
unique legal issues related to nonprofit corporations. Only recently has the rest of the bar 
come to recognize that representing nonprofit corporations constitutes a separate legal disci­
pline .... The academic literature in this field has mushroomed, and law schools have begun 
to integrate the field into their curricula."). 
39. See id. at 1581. No doubt using a stricter definition, Hansmann gives a significantly 
lower estimate, but it confirms a rapidly increasing trend. By his account, relying on figures 
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the share of GNP accounted for by the nonprofit sector 
rose from 1.1 % in 1929, to 2.8% in 1974, and to 3.6% in 1988. P. 227. 
40. Pp. 239-41. Nonprofit organizations are also a common form of enterprise because 
the legal definition of nonprofit is easily met. Nonprofits need not serve a charitable or 
philanthropic purpose. They can be run in order to make money, though they cannot legally 
distribute earnings as profits to investors. P. 228. This nondistribution constraint does not 
prevent nonprofits from paying handsome salaries to executives, managers, and other 
employees. 
41. P. 14. In a business corporation, according to Hansmann, stockholders contribute 
capital like any other lender, except that "the fixed rate paid on loans from the firm's lender­
members ... is typically set at zero for the sake of convenience, thus obscuring the fact that 
the members' contributions of capital are, in effect, loans." P. 14. Hansmann concludes that 
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Hansmann does not extend his treatment of the business corpora­
tion, given its prominence. He limits himself to a short account of 
the advantages of "investor-owned firms" (pp. 53-64). However 
important they are becoming, nonprofit organizations and other al­
ternatives represent only a small portion of economic activity com­
pared to the organizational behemoth of the late twentieth century, 
the for-profit business corporation.42 
Hansmann does masterful work in microanalysis. He suggests a 
useful theoretical framework to examine the organization of actual 
firms. He provides a convincing analysis of why the investor-owned 
corporation often has advantages - in terms of the costs of con­
tracting and ownership - over other forms of enterprise. Corpora­
tions owned by shareholders usually have lower costs of contracting 
for capital than firms financed only through debt because creditors 
cannot as easily control the risks of managerial opportunism (pp. 
53-56). In terms of the costs of ownership, the principal advantage 
of corporations owned by shareholders lies in the "homogeneity of 
interests" of maximizing profits and shareholder value (pp. 62-63, 
288).43 But Hansmann leaves the organizational punchline of his 
book undeveloped. It is important as well to look at broader devel­
opments at the level 'of ownership and control of large business cor­
porations, the work horses in most capitalist economies. 
The omission of a more extended treatment of business corpora­
tions can be forgiven, however, because the major contribution of 
The Ownership of Enterprise is to expand thinking about how en­
terprise is structured to meet the needs of its patrons. In this objec­
tive, Hansmann succeeds brilliantly. He demonstrates that investor 
ownership of enterprise should be subjected to critical analysis, not 
simply taken for granted. Alternatives to investor ownership may 
better serve the various patrons of enterprise in different situations. 
The viability and efficiency of these alternatives depend on the kind 
of enterprise and its social and economic circumstances.44 
JIJ. THE MA.CROANALYSIS OF ENTERPRISE 
In contrast to Hansmann's approach, a macroanalysis of enter­
prise organization should include four important social develop­
ments of the twentieth century. Two are uncontroversial: the rise 
"a business corporation is just a particular type of cooperative ... in which ownership is 
assigned to a group of the firm's patrons, and the persons who lend capital to a firm are just 
one among various classes of patrons with whom the firm deals." P. 15. 
42. See infra section III.A. 
43. But see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
44. Different circumstances include different countries. To an extent, Hansmann draws 
on international evidence to support his conclusions. p. 7. Examples include worker owner­
ship and codetermination, pp. 98-105, 110-112, farm marketing cooperatives, p. 122, con­
sumer retail cooperatives, pp. 163·64, utilities, pp. 180-81, and life insurance, p. 285. 
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to dominance of the business corporation as an organizational form 
in the global economy and the increasing importance of institu­
tional investor-owners of these corporations. In Institutional Share­
holders and Corporate Governance, G.P. Stapledon45 focuses on 
these developments in a comparative study of Great Britain and 
Australia. In my view, two additional macroanalytic developments 
in enterprise organization also deserve attention: the effects that 
corporate ownership patterns may have on the distribution of 
wealth in society and the effects that legal imperatives in corporate 
governance may have on ethical decisionmaking. Each of these 
four large-scale developments are briefly reviewed, and then 
Stapledon's contribution to understanding them is considered. 
A. The Dominance of the Business Corporation 
This century, the for-profit business corporation became the pri­
mary engine of economic enterprise in the world.46 By 1990, busi­
ness corporations accounted for more than ninety percent of total 
sales and receipts in the United States, and the 7000 largest corpo­
rations, with assets of $250 million or more, accounted for more 
than half of all sales and receipts.47 The corporate form has also 
become dominant abroad.48 The largest business firms in most 
countries are corporations.49 
In the late twentieth century, the exponential growth of multina­
tional or transnational corporate enterprise qualifies as one of the 
most important historical developments.so From 1969 to 1990, the 
45. Lecturer in Law and Associate of the Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regu­
lation, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne. 
46. For the classic history of the rise of the corporate form in the United States, see 
JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF TIIE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN TIIE LAW OF 
TIIE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 {1970). For a more general historical account, see SruART 
BRUCHEY, ENTERPRISE: THE DYNAMIC ECONOMY OF A FREE PEOPLE {1990). 
47. See Carl Kaysen, Introduction and Overview, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION To. 
DAY 3, 5 {Carl Kaysen ed., 1996). Reasons for "the dominance of the corporate form of 
0 organization " include flexibility of capital structure, central management, limited liability, 
and free transferability of equity ownership in shares. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, COR­
PORATE LAW § 1.1 {1986). 
48. See, e.g., Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Mulitnational Corpo· 
rations, 15 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 283, 285-87 {1990); Kaysen, Introduction and Overview, supra 
note 47, at 3-4. Today, Russia, China, and Eastern European countries have also adopted 
Western-style corporation laws. See Hendrik F. Jordaan, A Comparative Analysis of Corpo· 
rate Fiduciary Laws, 31 INTL. LAW. 133, 134 (1997). 
49. For a survey, see INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS, CORPORATIONS AND 
PARTNERSHIPS, vols. 1-3 {Koen Geens ed., 1997). 
50. See EDWARD M. GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
1-31 {1996); Eric W. Orts, The Legitimacy of Multinational Corporations, in PROGRESSIVE 
CORPORATE LAW 247, 247-52 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). According to the World 
Bank, the share of total global output produced by multinational affiliates increased from 
4.5% in 1970 to 7.5% in 1995, and their share of global manufacturing output increased from 
12% in 1977 to 18% in 1992. Martin Wolf, The Heart of the New World Economy, FIN. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at 12. 
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number of multinationals tripled from around 7000 to almost 
24,00o.si These multinational corporations are often structured as 
parent-subsidiary groups.s2 By 1994, there were approximately 
37 ,000 multinational parents, which accounted for more than 
200,000 foreign affiliates or subsidiaries.s3 The largest 300 multina­
tional corporations account for about one quarter of the world's 
total productive assets.s4 Half of all parents of multinational groups 
are incorporated in one of four countries: the United States, Great 
Britain, Germany, or Japan.ss 
B. The Rise of Institutional Investors 
A second macroanalytic trend in the organization of corporate 
enterprise is the increasing concentration of share ownership in in­
stitutional investors.s6 These institutions include public and private 
pension funds, mutual investment funds, insurance companies, and 
banks. Collectively, they hold more than half the stock of public 
corporations in the United States, and even greater percentages of 
some of the largest corporations.s7 The data indicate a sea change 
in the last half of the century. In 1950, institutions held only 8% of 
the total equity of corporations in the United States. The percent­
age increased to 33% in 1980, 45% in 1988, and 53% in 1990.ss In 
other countries, notably Great Britain, institutional holdings are 
even larger.s9 
The rise of institutional investors carries the potential to change 
the balance of power in corporate governance. The prospect that 
51. See DeAnne Julius, International Direct Investment: Strengthening the Policy Regime, 
in MANAGING THE WoRI.D EcoNoMY 269, 276 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994). 
52. See Al.FRED F. CoNARD, CoRPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 168-69 (1976); DETLEV F. 
V AGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 129 (1986). 
53. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEv., WoRLD lNvEsTMENT REPORT, 1994: 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, EMPLOYMENT AND THE WORKPLACE at 3-5 & tbl. 1.1, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTA D/ DCTI/10, U.N. Sales No. E.94.11.A.14 (1994). 
54. See Back in Fashion, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, at 5-6. The largest 100 multination­
als hold one fifth of global assets. See Wolf, supra note 50. 
55. See U.N. DEPT. OF EcoN. & Soc. DEv., WoRLD lNvEsTMENT REPORT, 1992: TRANS­
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS ENGINES OF GRowrn: at 13 box 1.1 n.1, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/ 
130, U.N. Sales No. E.92.11.A. (1992). 
56. Robert Clark describes the growth of institutional investors and financial in­
termediaries as the "third stage" of capitalism, arriving after the rise of the corporate form in 
the "first stage " and the professionalization of corporate managers in the "second stage." See 
Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management 
Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 562-64 (1981) (book review essay). 
57. See CAROLYN K. BRANCATO, THE BRANCATO REPORT ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 
PATTERNS OF INSTITUTIONAL lNvEsTMENT AND CONTROL IN THE USA, Sept. 1996, at 4; Co. 
LUMBIA CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJECT, 
THE GRowrn: OF INSTITUTIONAL INvESToRs IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS (1988). 
58. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corpo­
rate Monitor, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1291 (1991). 
59. Stapledon reports that institutions own 60% of British public corporations. P. 5. 
1964 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1947 
institutional ownership may close the famous "separation of owner­
ship and control" in public corporations60 provokes vigorous discus­
sion among legal academics in the United States. The predominant 
view cheers the rise of institutional shareholders but also recognizes 
that legal reform is needed for their potential power to be real­
ized.61 Other scholars argue that even with legal reforms institu­
tional investors may not have an economic interest in exerting 
influence over corporate managers. 62 At least, the rise of institu­
tional investors has changed corporate culture in the United States 
in the sense that managers now pay more serious attention to share­
holders' interests than they did before.63 
The growth of institutional investors has also begun to influence 
views of corporate governance abroad through the rapid interna­
tionalization of the capital markets.64 Institutional investors in the 
United States, Europe, and elsewhere seek to invest increasing 
amounts of capital throughout the world. This dynamic creates 
pressure that "disturbs preexisting factual and legal patterns of 
owner-manager relations within private firms" in different coun­
tries. 65 Stapledon gives an example of this trend in his study of in­
stitutional investors in Australia. British and U.S. foreign investors 
now own twenty-nine percent of outstanding shares of Australian 
corporations (p. 5). 
C. Effects on the Distribution of Wealth 
A third macroanalytic development concerns the effects that a 
dominant pattern of corporate organization and concentrated 
shareholder ownership may have on the distribution of wealth in 
60. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1933). 
61. See Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 117 (1988); see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. 
L. REv. 520 (1990) (arguing that institutional shareholder activism is possible but requires 
certain legal reforms); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institu­
tional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992) (arguing that institutional shareholder 
activism is not only possible with legal reform but desirable as a matter of policy); Coffee, 
supra note 58 (arguing that institutional investors are unlikely to tradeoff liquidity for control 
and outlining legal changes that would encourage them to do so). 
62. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991) (arguing that agency costs and conflicts of 
interest, as well as legal rules, fail to give institutional investors incentives to discipline corpo­
rate managers). 
63. See MICHAEL UsEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY MANAGERS ARE 
CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 10-11 (1996). 
64. For accounts of the extent and causes of the internationalization of capital markets in 
the last few decades, see Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure 
Rules in the Global Market, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 241, 243, 247-57; Richard A. Grasso, 
Globalization of the Equity Markets, 20 FORDHAM INTL. L.J. 1108, 1110-14 (1997). 
65. Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative 
Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 5 (1991). 
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society. In a recent article, Professor Jeffrey Gordon highlights the 
fact that even though, in real terms, corporate profits and stock 
market prices increased 250% in the United States from 1980 to 
1995, wages did not increase at all except for people in the top quin­
tile of income, and the distribution of income has become more un­
equal. 66 Average wages for rank-and-file employees have in fact 
declined from 1980 to 1996.67 In contrast to the happy days of the 
1950s and 1960s, when "income for all income groups was rising and 
inequality was decreasing," we seem now to be living in a time 
when "shareholders are gaining and workers are not."68 Gordon 
suggests a small solution that would enable employees to partici­
pate better in stock market gains through their retirement pen­
sions,69 but the phenomenon of soaring stocks and stagnating wages 
also implicates larger questions of the social organization of corpo­
rate enterprise, investment, and employment . 
.International trends in the distribution of income are also well 
known and intractable, dividing the globe into "first" and "third" 
worlds with radically different economic prospects and expectations 
of quality of life. Some economies in a transitional "second" world 
struggle for admission to privileged "first" world status, but in gen­
eral the inequality of wealth between people in rich and poor na­
tions continues to increase.70 Although multinational enterprises 
play an important role in raising the average standard of living,71 
66. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1519, 1534 (1997). 
67. From 1980 to 1996, average hourly wages in constant 1982 dollars fell in the United 
States from $7.78 to $7.42, and average weekly wages declined from $275 to $256. Bureau of 
the Census, U.S. Dept. of Co=erce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997, at 429. I 
thank Kent Greenfield for pointing me to these figures. 
68. Gordon, supra note 66, at 1526, 1534. While average wages have been declining, see 
supra note 67 and accompanying text, there is a controversy about the accuracy of the Labor 
Department's consumer price index, which is the index most often used for inflation adjust­
ments. Other price indices, such as the Co=erce Department's price index for personal 
consumption expenditures, and net gains in the worth of benefits for workers suggest that 
average real pay for workers has been "flat rather than declining between the early 1970s and 
early 1990s." John M. Berry, Think the Boom Has Left Workers Behind? Think Again, 
WASH. PoST. Aug. 7, 1997, at El. 
69. Specifically, Gordon reco=ends a "pension equity collar" that would guarantee a 
minimum return to employees that approximates long-term average projected equity return 
while giving those who create this financial instrument any gain in excess of long-term aver­
ages. See id. at 1519, 1562-66. 
70. According to one estimate, the ratio of income in the world between the richest 20% 
of people and the poorest 20% increased from 30-to-1 in 1960 to 60-to-1 in 1990. See Gerald 
Epstein, Power, Profits, and Cooperation in the Global Economy, in CREATING A NEW 
WORLD ECONOMY: FORCES OF CHANGE & PLANS FOR ACTION 19, 22-23, 25 fig. 1.4 (Gerald 
Epstein et al. eds., 1993). 
71. See Robert Chote, Risks Outweighed by Gains, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1997, at 9 (dis­
cussing evidence that multinational investment brings spillover benefits as well as direct con­
tributions to income and employment in developing countries); Andrew E. Serwer, The End 
of the World ls Nigh - Or ls It?, FORTUNE, May 2, 1994, at 123 ("In almost any way you 
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billions of people are left out of the emerging global business 
civilization.72 
D. Enterprise Ethics 
A fourth macroanalytic dimension of change concerns the ef­
fects that an increasingly concentrated corporate economy driven 
by the interests of large institutional investors may have on non­
economic or "social" issues. Although the rise of institutional in­
vestors promises to discipline managers,73 their influence aims to 
increase economic competitiveness and bottom-line returns. This 
has obvious social benefits, but the increasing pressure on corpora­
tions for economic performance may also reduce the discretion that 
corporate managers have to balance economic decisionmaking with 
ethical considerations. In other words, the scope for corporate so­
cial responsibility may be narrowed. To give only one important 
example, the economic imperatives of institutional investors may 
lead to a systemic conflict with corporate governance practices and 
initiatives designed to protect the natural environment.74 This det­
rimental macroanalytic trend may call for nontraditional regulatory 
solutions that include adjustments within the law of enterprise 
organization.75 
IV. STAPLEDON'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE MACROANAL YSIS OF 
CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 
Although Stapledon's Institutional Shareholders and Corporate 
Governance does not paint with a brush as broad as the macroanal­
ysis outlined above, it nevertheless contributes to understanding 
two large trends in enterprise organization. First, Stapledon's de­
tailed account of corporate governance in Great Britain and Aus­
tralia confirms the international trend toward the dominance of the 
corporate form. Second and more importantly, the book contrib­
utes to a detailed understanding of the rise of institutional investors 
and their influence in both countries (pp. 33-154, 157-203). 
care to measure, life is getting better for people in developing nations.") (quoting Barton 
Biggs, Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asset Management). 
72. For a critique along these lines, see RICHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAOH, 
GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 16 (1994) ("Of 
the 5.4 billion people on earth, almost 3.6 billion have neither cash nor credit to buy much of 
anything. A majority of people on the planet are at most window-shoppers."). 
73. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
74. See Buxbaum, supra note 65, at 28 (arguing that "ecological imperatives" require "a 
new respect for a different, longer term vision of corporate behavior"). 
75. Cf. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REv. 1 (1997) (arguing for collaboration between government and business in regulating en­
vironmental and other behavior); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 1227 (1995) (recommending European-style environmental management and auditing 
systems to encourage corporate environmental responsibility). 
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Of particular interest, Stapledon presents Australia as an inter­
esting hybrid case of corporate governance between two competing 
models: the "outsider" system of Great Britain and the United 
States characterized by the relative activism of institutional share­
holders, and the "insider" system of Germany and Japan character­
ized by the relative passivity of shareholders as compared with the 
dominant influence of banks.76 In other words, Australia provides a 
case study of possible convergence of the leading corporate govern­
ance systems in the world. Stapledon states this thesis as a conclu­
sion, however, and he does not explain much further how the 
details of the Australian system relate to larger corporate govern­
ance issues. Instead, he is satisfied to transplant to foreign soil the 
recommendations of corporate law scholars in the United States 
who advocate increased monitoring of corporate boards and man­
agers by institutional shareholders (pp. 285-95). But macroanalysis, 
and comparative macroanalysis in particular, is very difficult given 
the empirical complexity of large economic trends and the need to 
master the details of different legal systems in order to assess them. 
Rather than criticism on this ground, Stapledon deserves credit for 
providing a good reference source for others who may examine the 
Australian system of corporate governance and compare it, not only 
to Great Britain, but also to the United States, Germany, and 
Japan.77 
V. THE UNEASY CASE FOR INVESTOR OWNERSHIP OF 
ENTERPRISE 
Reading The Ownership of Enterprise and Institutional Share­
holders and Corporate Governance together leads one to think 
about the likely future of enterprise organization in the twenty-first 
century. From a microanalytic perspective, Hansmann's vision of 
the future is flexible. The structures of enterprise will fluctuate in 
accordance with the costs of contracting and ownership and in re­
sponse to changes in other economic conditions, law, technology, 
and culture. The likely result will be a continuing diversity of orga­
nizations. Employee-owned, nonprofit, and other alternative forms 
of enterprise will compete with the investor-owned paradigm. At 
the macroanalytic level, Stapledon's study confirms the view of 
other observers that institutional investor ownership will remain a 
primary large-scale determinant of the structure of enterprise.78 
76. Pp. 3-4, 279. (citing J.R. Franks & C.P. Mayer, Corporate Control: A Synthesis of the 
International Evidence, in RELATIONAL INVESTING (John C. Coffee et al. eds., 1996)). 
77. For a useful example of this kind of comparative work, see Bernard S. Black & John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 
MICH. L. REv. 1997 (1994). 
78. See supra section III B. 
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From different perspectives, both Hansmann and Stapledon make 
the case for investor ownership as the predominant mode of enter­
prise organization in the future, but this case is uneasy for two 
reasons. 
First, descriptively, the likely future structure of enterprise or­
ganization is uncertain. Although Hansmann argues that some 
form of investor ownership is often the best available alternative, 
he also shows that investor ownership is not foreordained by eco­
nomic logic. Alternative forms of ownership are not only possible; 
they exist in large numbers in the real world. From a microanalytic 
perspective, the case for investor ownership is uncertain because it 
depends on the particular circumstances and preferences of the var­
ious interests of patrons within firms. Investor ownership often, but 
not always, makes the most economic sense. 
Second, normatively, some of the larger social effects of investor 
capitalism give cause for concern.79 Stapledon's macroanalysis of 
corporate enterprise and institutional investors suggests that this 
model of enterprise organization is destined to continue in the fu­
ture on a global scale. However, some attributes of the emerging 
system of investor capitalism remain uncertain. For example, the 
increasing international scope of institutional investors may either 
exert pressure for a convergence of "insider" and "outsider" mod­
els of investor capitalism - perhaps along the lines of a hybrid such 
as in Australia - or intensify competition among them.80 In addi­
tion, the continuing primacy of investor-owned enterprise may 
worsen social problems with respect to the relative compensation of 
non-investor employees (and the unemployed) and the ability of 
managers to respond to other ethical imperatives as well as to the 
demands of investors. s1 
Reflecting on the uneasy case for investor ownership leads me 
also to conclude with two additional related themes. First, I con­
sider whether a recent analysis of "the tragedy of the anticommons" 
may have an application for microanalytic theories of enterprise or­
ganization. 82 Second, I suggest on the macroanalytic level that the 
Anglo-American "outsider" investor model of the publicly held 
corporation may offer the best long-term hope for solving some of 
the social problems "that arise in a global system of investor 
capitalism. 
79. I borrow the term "investor capitalism" from Michael Useem. See supra note 63. See 
also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Folklore of Investor Capitalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1970, 1986-88 
{1997) {book review) (discussing various aspects of the uncertain future of investor 
capitalism). 
80. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
81. See supra sections III.C, III.D. 
82. See Heller, supra note 31. 
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A. The Firm as an Anticommons 
1969 
Hansmann's book provides convincing microanalytic arguments 
for why investor ownership proves to be relatively efficient in most 
circumstances.83 In a recent article, Professor Michael Heller sug­
gests a related reason for the primacy of investor ownership.s4 Hel­
ler introduces a theory of property that refers to the difficulty 
created when too many rights of ownership are granted in a particu­
lar asset.85 This is "the tragedy of the anticommons," which con­
trasts with the better known "tragedy of the commons" that can 
appear when no private rights of ownership are granted in a collec­
tive asset.86 As an illustration of the anticommons, Heller develops 
the case of Russian storefronts in the post-communist transition pe­
riod in the early 1990s. s7 Although privatization created property 
rights in Russian stores, so many rights were created and distrib­
uted that nobody possessed a "core bundle" of ownership rights to 
make the stores useful.SS Because the newly privatized storefront 
properties had too many owners, they could not be used effi­
ciently.89 Instead, metal kiosks cropped up outside empty 
storefronts on the streets of Moscow and. other Russian cities.90 
An analogous story may be told about the structure of enter­
prise organization. Hansmann treats the problem of ownership of 
enterprise in terms of the costs of managerial opportunism, collec­
tive decisionmaking, risk bearing, and transition.91 Heller suggests 
another perspective on the ownership of enterprise that reinforces 
Hansmann's emphasis on the costs of collective decisionmaking. 
Lawmakers should avoid creating "a tragedy of the anticommons" 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16 & 43. 
84. See Heller, supra note 31. For the gestation of my application of Heller's idea of the 
anticommons to the firm, I credit conversations with Heller, as well as Merritt Fox and 
Deborah Malamud. 
85. See id. at 624 ("In an anticommons, . . .  multiple owners are each endowed with the 
right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. 
When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to un­
deruse - a tragedy of the anticommons.") (footnotes omitted). 
86. The classic article is Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 
(1968). 
87. Heller, supra note 31, at 622-24, 633-47. Heller also adduces other examples of 
anticommons property in modem-day Canada, Japan, and the United States. Id. at 679 
n.259, 682-84, 684-85. 
88. See id. at 622-24, 632-42. 
89. See id. at 622-23, 633-42. 
90. See id. at 622-23, 642-45. The same phenomenon of kiosks in front of empty stores 
occurred elsewhere in postcommunist Eastern Europe, such as Poland, but lasted for a 
shorter time. See id. at 634 & n.65, 647 n.119. 
91. See supra section I.B. 
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in the ownership structures of enterprise.92 Effective governance of 
an enterprise requires a "core bundle" of ownership rights held by a 
relatively coherent group of patrons.93 As Hansmann demon­
strates, this core group of patrons need not be equity investors; em­
ployees or manager-owners may step forward to fill this role. 
Whoever the "core" ownership group may be, an anticommons per­
spective suggests that the law of enterprise organization should not 
split ownership rights into so many parts that no one can exercise 
effective control.94 
These lessons from Hansmann and Heller should give pause to 
those who advocate a radical communitarian restructuring of the 
public corporation.95 Overregulation of publicly held corporations 
would likely lead investors, managers, or employees to preserve the 
efficient "core bundle" of ownership rights by taking firms private 
through leveraged buyouts or simply leaving a public corporation 
and starting fresh as a new closely owned firm.96 If these alterna­
tives were legally barred, then a fate similar to that of vacant 
storefronts and flimsy kiosks in Russia might be recreated on a 
larger and more detrimental scale in enterprise organization. 
B. The Virtues of the Public Corporation 
From a macroanalytic point of view, the uncertain future of en­
terprise organization centers largely on whether any particular form 
of investor capitalism will prevail. Public corporations with a large 
number of equity shareholders are not always the rule. In other 
countries, most notably Germany and Japan, corporations usually 
depend instead on concentrated share ownership by large banks 
and other corporations.97 To borrow from Hansmann, but to make 
92. Heller makes this point specifically with respect to the privatization of enterprise in 
China and Eastern Europe. See Heller, supra note 31, at 680-82. I suggest that his approach 
might be expanded to apply to the law of enterprise organization more generally. 
93. Cf. supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
94. One may think that nonprofit organization threatens to splinter ownership rights, and 
this is true to an extent. See supra section 11.C. Because profits in the enterprise cannot be 
distributed, however, the nonprofit structure effectively centralizes rights of control over the 
entity's ownership of assets in the board of trustees or a similar structure, while constraining 
the extent to which those in control may deplete the assets of the firm. 
95. For a thoughtful introduction to this literature, see David Millon, Communitarianism 
in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE 
LAw, supra note 50, at 1, 22-31. 
96. This analysis may explain the relative rarity of public corporations in countries, such 
as Germany, that mandate employee representation on corporate boards. See infra note 97 
and supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
97. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, 
and the United States, 102 YALE LJ. 1927, 1936-48 (1993); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Mark 
J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and 
Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 882-95 (1993) (description of Japanese system); 
Friedrich K. Kubler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 51 
BROOK. L. REv. 97, 97-102 (1991) (description of German system). 
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the point in a larger context, the future structure of corporate enter­
prise is also in this sense "contingent."98 
In my view, the triumph of investor capitalism in the global 
economy since the Second Russian Revolution and the end of the 
Cold War99 will not lead to a convergence of forms of organization, 
much less "the end of history."100 Instead, it is more likely that a 
competition among different forms of investor capitalism and dif­
ferent varieties of investor-owned enterprise will continue into the 
next century.101 The increasing globalization of both corporate or­
ganization and capital markets will most likely sharpen this 
competition.102 
The practice in comparative corporate governance of making fu­
ture predictions has proven treacherous for those scholars who 
have engaged in it. Only a few years ago, the "insider" system of 
investor capitalism in Germany and Japan looked good to legal the­
orists imbued with the doctrines of agency costs theory. According 
to this theory, a few large consolidated investors could better moni­
tor managers than the dispersed shareholders in the Anglo-Ameri­
can model. Given the anemic condition of the German and 
Japanese economies as of this writing, however, the corporate gov­
ernance system of "outsider" investors in the United States and 
Great Britain now looks comparatively good. 
Capitalism is cyclical, and economic predictions are dangerous. 
It is not possible to predict with any certainty whether the "insider" 
or "outsider" model will prevail in the future. Perhaps both will 
coexist in different cultures and circumstances. Or perhaps Austra-
98. See supra text accompanying notes 6 and 7. 
99. There are minor exceptions, such as in North Korea and Cuba, and the partial excep­
tion of the large communist-capitalist experiment in China. 
100. But see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). 
For an argument that corporate governance regimes are not likely to converge internation­
ally in the near future because of cultural and legal path dependence, see Lucian Bebchuk & 
Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY, supra note 24, at 565. 
101. See JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GooD COMPANY: A STUDY OF CORPOR­
ATE GOVERNANCE IN FrVE COUNTRIES (1994) (comparing Germany, Japan, France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States); CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER & FoNs 
TROMPENAARS, THE SEVEN CuLTURES OF CAPITALISM: VALUE SYSTEMS FOR CREATING 
WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, GERMANY, FRANCE, BRITAIN, SWEDEN, AND THE 
NETHERLANDS (1993) (popular and informal account of differences in economic systems 
based largely on interviews with corporate executives); LESTER C. THUROW, HEAD To 
HEAD: THE CoMING ECONOMIC BATTI..E AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE, AND AMERICA 247 
(1992) (arguing that a competition among competing forms of capitalism will characterize the 
next century); Owen M. Fiss, Capitalism and Democracy, 13 MICH. J. INTL. L. 908, 919 (1992) 
("A battle still needs to be fought. It will not be the battle that has dominated the twentieth 
century, between capitalism and socialism, but rather a battle within capitalism. Passions 
might not run as high, for the divisions are less clear-cut, but the stakes and concerns are 
every bit as great") 
102. See supra notes 48-55 & 64-65 and accompanying text. 
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lian-style hybrids will arise that combine the best aspects of both 
models.103 Future work in the macroanalysis of enterprise organi­
zation should examine this important choice between different 
kinds of capitalism. 
From a normative macroanalytic perspective, my tentative pref­
erence - recognizing my possible cultural bias - favors the 
Anglo-American model of the public· corporation for two reasons 
related to the macroanalytic trends outlined above. First, this 
model permits the development of mechanisms to enable most peo­
ple in the world economy to participate in the success of corporate 
enterprise. The relatively open structure of public corporations en­
courages widespread participation by average citizens who may in­
vest in them through pensions, insurance, or investments of savings 
in mutual funds. Public corporations enable the "fourth stage of 
capitalism" heralded by Dean Robert Clark, which contemplates -
and in part is already achieving - a world in which the benefits of 
corporate enterprise are shared by a broad range of people, not 
only wealthy individuals and corporate chieftains.104 The develop­
ment of fourth-stage capitalism is nascent, however, and nothing 
guarantees the continued dominance of the public corporation over 
other models of investor ownership. 
The second reason that I believe the "outsider" model of institu­
tional investors and public corporations offers the best hope for the 
evolution of a humane future is that this model will more likely give 
scope for ethical considerations in corporate decisionmaking. 
Although many legal scholars call for institutional investors to 
tighten the economic reins on public corporations, ethical consider­
ations should also continue to play an important role in corporate 
management. Currently, we may have already begun to witness the 
effects of a system of enterprise organization that focuses too exclu­
sively on the interests of investors to the harm of other important 
social interests. The public corporation, even with its various "dis­
eases,"105 offers the best alternative for addressing these social con­
cerns at the same time as it pursues the central wealth-producing 
function of business. Public corporations owned by a broad range 
103. The strength of the case for Australia as a corporate governance hybrid depends in 
part on its future economic success. One observer describes Australia as "having an infinite 
capacity to disappoint." Tony Walker, Fortune's Favour Frittered Away, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27, 
1997, Survey on Australia, at 1. At least with respect to corporate governance, however, 
changes are in progress. Banking has been deregulated. See Elizabeth Robinson, Big Four 
Called to Account, Fm. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, Survey on Australia, at 4. And individual share 
ownership has increased to include more than one-third of the population in response partly 
to privatizations and reform of Australia's main stock exchange, the ASX. Elizabeth Robin­
son, Sharecroppers to Shareholders, Fm. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, Survey on Australia, at 4. 
104. Clark, supra note 56, at 565-69. 
105. Alfred F. Conard, Theses for a Corporate Reformation, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. Rev. 259, 
262-79 (1986) (diagnosing various illnesses from "abuses of control" to "the profit fixation"). 
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of investors are more likely to include the public interest, as well as 
private gain, as an objective in doing business compared with large 
corporations that are closely held by only a few very wealthy indi­
viduals.106 A diverse body of individual owners will exert pressure 
to address various interests of social concern, often through differ­
ent kinds of institutional investors.107 In addition, securities regula­
tion of public corporations often requires disclosure of information 
in annual and quarterly financial reports that focuses public opinion 
on issues of public interest. Recent examples include an emphasis 
on reporting information about executive compensation108 and en­
vironmental liabilities.109 A diverse and numerous group of owners 
with access to significant information about the social as well as fi­
nancial performance of public corporations increases the likelihood 
that they will act as good institutional citizens.110 
CONCLUSION 
From different perspectives, Henry Hansmann and G.P. 
Stapledon support the view that investor capitalism will continue to 
provide the primary mode of enterprise organization in the twenty­
first century. Their analysis does not, however, provide answers to 
some troubling social issues. A broad view of the law of enterprise 
organization should continue to address these issues from both 
micro- and macroanalytic perspectives.111 This approach suggests a 
106. The American Law lnstitute's Principles of Corporate Governance recognizes that 
"a corporation should have as its object the conduct of business activities" that includes "eth­
ical considerations" as well as "enhancing profit and shareholder gain." PRINCIPLES OF COR­
PORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND R:scoMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1992). The ALI also 
observes that "ethical considerations reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible 
conduct of business necessarily include ethical responsibilities that may be owed to persons 
other than shareholders with whom the corporation has a legitimate concern, such as em­
ployees, customers, suppliers, and members of the co=unities within which the corporation 
operates." Id. § 2.01 cmt. h. Corporate constituency statutes enacted in most states confirnI 
the permissibility of a broad view of the objective of corporations. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond 
Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. R:sv. 14, 26-
35, 90-92, 134-35 (1992). 
107. In this respect, the difference between public and private pension funds is well 
known. Public funds tend to be much more aggressive in pursuing issues that they see as in 
the public interest than private funds which are usually controlled by corporate managers. 
See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. R:sv. 75, 
78 (1993). 
108. See Regulation S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1997). 
109. See, e.g., John W. Bagby et al., How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate Lia­
bility and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 225, 287-337 (1995); Elizabeth Ann 
Glass Geltman, Disclosure of Contingent Environmental Liabilities by Public Companies 
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 16 HAR.v. ENVrL. L. R:sv. 129, 130-69 (1992). 
110. Cf. James B. White, How Should We Talk About Corporations? The Languages of 
Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416, 1423 (1985) (arguing that "good citizen­
ship" requires recognition of the fact that a corporation is the "center of a web of mutually­
beneficial relations extending in many directions"). 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 1 and 2. 
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merger of traditionally separate legal disciplines in the United 
States: combining, for ex�mple, corporate, employment, and labor 
law in the German sense of Unternehmensrecht ("enterprise 
law").112 If a label for this research agenda is desired, one might 
refer to a "neo-liberalism" that advocates "the widest possible own­
ership of shares as a means for reducing further the class conflict 
and improving the working of the 'social market economy' (soziale 
Marktwirtschaft). "113 As Jeffrey Gordon writes, "society should 
work in a way that benefits all of its economic groups."114 Environ­
mental and other ethical concerns should also be included in the 
equation. This approach to the law of enterprise organization seeks 
a middle course between the historically discredited doctrines of so­
cialism and nationalism, on one hand, and the harsh social conse­
quences of an unfettered global investor capitalism, on the other. 
A turn of legal research in this direction may help to find methods 
to harness corporate enterprises and their owners, including institu­
tional investors, more strongly in the social interest. 
112. See Eruc STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAws: NATIONAL RE­
FORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION 93 (1971); Richard M. Buxbaum, Federalism 
and Company Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1163, 1163 n.4 (1984). 
113. STEIN, supra note 112, at 97. Some movement in this direction is discernible in both 
recent practice and scholarship. See, e.g., Roger E. Alcaly, Reinventing the Corporation, N.Y. 
REv. OF BooKS, Apr. 10, 1997, at 38 (arguing that a "major new development in the relations 
between American workers and businesses has been quietly taking place" which exhibits "a 
trend toward a new kind of corporate culture in which the interests of managers, sharehold­
ers, and workers are closely and deliberately linked" through mechanisms such as profit­
sharing and employee stock ownership plans). 
114. Gordon, supra note 66, at 1520. 
